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MONTGOMERY E. PIKE*
It is a familiar and ancient doctrine that the corporation as
an entity, distinct from its shareholders, will be disregarded by
the courts to prevent fraud, injustice, evasion of laws, or ob-
struction of public policy. The entity theory is a convenient
one to be used only when legitimate ends are served and is in
no way sacrosanct in the mind of the Court.
During the past thirty years, an outgrowth of this doctrine
has been evolving, in some courts, to the effect that where one
corporation controls another and uses it for its own purposes,
the dominant corporation shall be responsible for the acts of the
subservient one. This principle has its most frequent application
in cases of a parent using subsidiary corporations. Other cases
have arisen where there is a common ownership of the dominant
and servient corporation.
This formula is now used not only as a reason for disregard-
ing the entity of the controlled corporation in the familiar cases
mentioned in the opening paragraph, but is also used to carry
further the responsibility of the dominant corporation for the
acts of the servient one. Thus the dominant corporation is held
responsible for such unpremeditated torts of the servient corpo-
ration as the negligence of its employees and even, at times, for
its debts and contracts.
The following are the type statements of this principle:
"The legal fiction of distinct corporate existence will be disre-
garded when necessary to circumvent fraud. It may also be
disregarded in cases where a corporation is so organized and
controlled, and its affairs so conducted as to make it merely an
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instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation,"' and,
"where such ownership of stock is resorted to, not for the pur-
pose of participating in the affairs of the corporation in which
it is held in a manner normal and usual with stockholders but
for the purpose of making it a mere agent or instrumentality
or department of another company, the courts will look through
the forms to realities of the relation between the companies as
if the corporate agency did not exist and will deal with them as
the justice of the case may require."'
For the purpose of this paper it will be convenient to speak
of the principle as the instrumentality rule. Where the servient
corporation is used by the dominant one to perpetrate fraud,
evade law, etc., there is no controversy. The value of the instru-
mentality rule as a separate rule is that it may make the domi-
nant corporation liable for torts and possibly contract obligations
of the instrumentality corporation. And, as would be expected,
the rule is denied by some courts at these points. When courts
make this advance, it illustrates once more the flexibility of
existing principles and their applicability to new situations and
inventions. In this case, the greatly increased practice on the
part of corporations of carrying on parts or departments of their
business through subsidiaries or other servient corporations con-
stitutes the new situation or device to which the law is to be
applied.
Practically, the cherished value of the corporate form of
doing business is the preservation of the private estate of the
individual shareholder, the part which he does not care to risk
in the venture. This is socially valuable in that it facilitates the
bringing together of capital from many sources. But in case of
parent and subsidiary corporations, the individual shareholder
in the parent corporation has already achieved immunity from
the debts of the parent. Shall he achieve further immunity
In re Watertown Paper Co., 169 Fed. z5z (C.C.A. 2nd, 19o9).
2 United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. z6, 40 S. Ct. 425, 64. L. Ed.
760 (192o).
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through the immunity of the parent from the debts of its various
departments? And in case of pyramided corporations, shall
immunity be added to immunity? A possible answer to this
question is in the language of the court at the conclusion of its
opinion in the case of Industrial Research Corporation v. Gen-
eral Motors Corporation:' "It is against sound policy, when a
corporation has grown so large and it has entered into activities
so various and so generally distributed that it finds itself com-
pelled to operate through many subsidiaries, doing nothing
directly itself in carrying on the business to permit it to enjoy
exclusively the fruits of such subsidiary activity and escape the
concomitant responsibilities flowing therefrom."
It should be noted that the court, in this case, considered
the parent responsible for a patent infringement by one of its
subsidiaries. This should be distinguished from torts such as
negligence committed by a subsidiary. The latter type of case
presents a more severe test of the instrumentality rule. It is
easier for the court to hold that the parent should not take
advantage of patent infringements by its subsidiary as this fits
into the established patterns of judicial thinking. It has the
appearance of a fraud upon the law, and of a device to permit
the parent to infringe a patent and escape responsibility there-
for. Nevertheless the language is very general. There will be
discussed, in this paper, cases involving the liability of the par-
ent for the negligence of its subsidiary instrumentality.
The hesitancy of some courts to carry the instrumentality
rule to such advanced ground is sometimes based on a reductio
ad absurdum argument. To deny the parent immunity from
obligations and liabilities of subsidiaries because they are con-
trolled as departments or instrumentalities is also to deny im-
munity to the individual shareholder who controls a corpora-
tion, or perhaps owns all its stock. The argument recognizes no
distinction between the individual in control of a corporation
and the corporation in control of another corporation. Such
3 z9 Fed. (2d) 623 (D.C., Ohio, i928).
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courts would confine the application of the instrumentality rule
to the familiar types of cases which are applicable to individuals
as shareholders and corporations as shareholders alike, namely,
cases where the corporation is used as an instrumentality by its
shareholders to perpetrate frauds, evade laws, etc. But the
reader will note that in both of the type forms of statement of
the instrumentality rule, as above quoted, and which are quoted
in one way or the other in the numerous cases recognizing the
rule, no mention is made of the individual shareholder. Only
the parent corporation or other form of dominating corporation
is mentioned. The distinction is assumed without argument.
There is an occasional remark, such as that quoted above from
Industrial Research Corporation v. General Motors Corpora-
tion.' The silence as to argument indicates that to the courts
citing the rule, it is axiomatic that we should have a special rule
for a corporation which conducts its authorized business through
incorporated departments or instrumentalities.
Another ad absrdum argument against the rule, and the
one most difficult for a proponent of the rule in its extreme
application to handle, is that it is impossible to distinguish
between the case where a parent exercises the usual controls
through majority stock ownership, election of directors and the
like, and the case where the subsidiary is so dominated and con-
trolled as to become a mere instrumentality or adjunct of the
parent. The argument is that under the company lawyer's ad-
vice, all forms of separation between parent and subsidiary will
be meticulously observed. Separate books, separate accounts,
separate financing of the business of the subsidiary will be ob-
served. No direct interference in the subsidiary's business by
the parent will be discovered. But with the same directors and
officers as the parent, the subsidiary is under the parent's control
for all practical purposes. And (the argument proceeds), a
court could not prohibit a parent from owning stock in asubsidi-
ary and exercising the usual controls through stock ownership,
4 See note 3, supra.
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by election of such directors and officers as the parent desires,
so long as statutory law permits one corporation to own voting
control in another.
It would not seem so shocking if the court should admit the
ad absurdurn argument and should then go on to hold that
when a corporation conducts its own business through corporate
instrumentalities which it controls by stock ownership, the thing
speaks for itself, and no further evidence of control is necessary
to make the parent responsible for the acts of the subsidiary.
However, an examination of the cases shows the courts making
a sincere effort to weigh the evidence and determine the nice
point whether the participation in the affairs of the subsidiary
is in the manner normal and usual with stockholders or whether
it is for the purpose of making it a mere agent, instrumentality,
or department of the parent.
Sometimes the acts speak for themselves. Once it is shown
that the parent organized a subsidiary to commit a fraud, or
evade a law, or permitted such acts in its subsidiary, to the
advantage of the parent, the instrumentality formula may be
applied without further evidence of direction or control. No
amount of legal care in keeping the corporations technically
separate would avail. A discussion of such cases, which are
numerous, is not necessary to this paper.
Nor will time permit an excursion into bankruptcy and
receivership cases where the parent attempts to present its claim
to the trustee or receiver of its insolvent subsidiary. If the claim
of the parent is not allowed, it seems to be a recognition that
the parent is liable for the debts of the subsidiary. Sometimes
the parent's claim has been disallowed because the insolvent
subsidiary was proved to be an instrumentality. But in these
cases other equitable considerations were generally also assigned
as reasons for the courts holding.
A reference to one of these cases is pertinent at this point as
illustrating the proof usually adduced to demonstrate an instru-
mentality. In In re Otsego Waxed Paper Co.,' the federal dis-
14 Fed. Supp. i5 (D.C. Mich., 1935).
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trict judge disallowed the parent's claim on the sole ground
that the bankrupt subsidiary was an instrumentality of the par-
ent. The court said that it was sufficient to prove that the bank-
rupt was a mere instrumentality of the parent and not necessary
to prove that the subsidiary was used to perpetrate a fraud, in
order to justify the trustee's refusal to allow the parent's claim.
The parent's claim was about one-third of the total of unsecured
claims and there was no suggestion made that the subsidiary
was inadequately financed or fraudulently held out. It was
noted that the parent manufactured paper board, the bankrupt
manufactured waxed paper; the plants were adjacent; all books
of the bankrupt were kept by the parent's employees; all mat-
ters of the bankrupt's business policies were directed by the
parent's officers; all of the bankrupt's capital stock was owned
by the parent. The directorates were interlocking. The bank-
rupt's principal office was in the parent's main office. All loans
and purchases were made through the parent's office. Thus it
was shown that the subsidiary was a mere instrumentality of
the parent.
In patent infringement cases, the federal courts have used
the instrumentality rule in some instances. This was not so,
however, in Owl Fumigating Corporation v. California Cyanide
Co., Inc.,6 where the court would require that the parent organ-
ized the subsidiary to infringe the patent or conspired with the
subsidiary to infringe it. The parent not having done so was
held not liable. In Union Sulphur Co. v. Freeport Texas Co.,7
the parent was found to have known of the projected violation
of plaintiff's rights and to have actively participated. Both cases
state the rule that mere stock ownership, interlocking direc-
torates and community of officers will not make the parent
liable. But in Industrial Research Corporation v. General
Motors Corporation,8 and in Detroit Motor Appliance Co. v.
6 3o Fed. (zd) 8IZ (C.C.A. 3rd, 1929).
S25 Fed. 634 (D.C. Del., 1918).
8 29 Fed. (2d) 623 (D.C. Ohio, 1928).
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General Motors Corporation,9 it was considered enough to
prove that the subsidiary was controlled as a department by
the parent.
In the Industrial Research Corp. case, it was enough to call
attention to an admission in the pleadings that the policies and
business of the subsidiary were wholly controlled and directed
by the parent, to convert the subsidiary into a "mere agent or
instrumentality." There was however more 'cogent proof,'
"for," said the court, "exhibits are here, in the form of news-
paper, sheet, and pamphlet advertising put on on behalf of the
General Motors Corporation which imply most clearly that the
alleged local agencies, though distinct corporations, are mere
adjuncts to the General Motors Corporation. Aside from the
other exhibit publications, the showing made in the annual re-
ports of the General Motors Corporation setting forth for in-
stance the Chevrolet Motor Company as a division of the Gen-
eral Motors Corporation, and a classification of the manufactur-
ing and selling channels by which the overhead corporation has
contacts with the public leave little room to doubt, not merely of
the subsidiary character of the Chevrolet Motor Ohio Company
and the General Motors Truck Company, but that these are
mere conveniences employed by the principal movants in the
transaction of their business. There is also in evidence the
corporate articles of the General Motors Corporation which
provide for the manufacturing and dealing 'in automobiles,
trucks, cars, boats, flying machines, and other vehicles, their
parts and accessories, and kindred articles, and to generally con-
duct an automobile business in all its branches.'"
Nor is it necessary under this rule that the parent conspired
in or directed the infringement. A more diffused type of con-
trol is sufficient. In the Detroit Motor Appliance Co. case, the
parent was found guilty of contempt of court in disobeying a
previous order. The disobedience was by subsidiaries, The
Cadillac Motor Car Co., and others. It was shown that the
1 5 Fed. Supp. 27 (E.D. II., 1933).
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parent had ordered the subsidiaries to desist. This was taken
as evidence that the subsidiaries were controlled as instrumen-
talities. There was of course other evidence to the same point.
Agency was proven by (i) advertising the subsidiaries as divi-
sions, (2) identical officers with the parent, and (3) orders
given the subsidiaries to desist."0
In cases where the parent or dominant corporation is sued
for damages resulting from the negligence of an employee of
a subsidiary or servient corporation the cases are often made
to turn on the instrumentality rule. The question of fact
generally is whether the subsidiary or servient corporation is
controlled in such a manner as to make it a mere instrumen-
tality of the dominant corporation. Thus, in Berkey v. Third
Ave. Ry. Co., the plaintiff sued the parent for the negligence
of an employee of a subsidiary street railway corporation. The
statement of the court was that the dominion of the parent
may be so complete and interference so obtrusive that the sub-
sidiary will be its agent. The evidence that it was not so oper-
ated by the defendant was that (i) it was not organized by the
parent; (2) it paid its own employees who never went off its
lines; (3) it paid all its own expenses and for its own repairs;
(4) it was a large company and highly solvent; (5) advances
by the parent for operating expenses were treated strictly as
loans; (6) it leased its new cars from the parent. Opposed to
this, the dissenting opinion noted that (i) the parent's pension
system included the subsidiary; (2) paymasters operated for
the entire system; (3) the parent paid for advertising for the
subsidiary; (4) the parent set up a central school of instructions
for employees for the entire system; (5) there was a central
department for repairs and construction; (6) there was a com-
mon purchasing agent; (7) identity of officers and directors;
(8) ownership through stock ownership by the parent. The
10 See also a similar case in Radio Craft Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg.
Co., 7 Fed. (2d) 432 (C.C.A. 3 rd, I925) for the same rule and the same
results.
1 ?44 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 5o A.L.R. 599 (1926).
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majority held the parent not responsible for the tort of the
subsidiary.
In M~angan v. Terminal Transportation System, 2 the plain-
tiff was injured by the operation of a cab belonging to one of
four operating companies. The defendant, the Terminal Com-
pany, was related to these four companies in that defendant
was a managing company and the four companies were operating
companies, all owned by Yellow Truck and Coach Manufactur-
ing Company, which system also included a manufacturing com-
pany, a sales company, and a financing company. The Terminal
Company was held responsible for the tort, upon the finding
that the four operating corporations were the agents and instru-
mentalities through which defendant carried on its business and
that their operation was controlled by the defendant. The evi-
dence was that (i) the defendant held the contract to furnish
the cabs at the various terminals and used the operating com-
panies to perform this contract, (2) provided starters and in-
spectors, (3) kept the books of the operating companies, (4)
received the reports of daily receipts, (5) drew all payroll
checks, (6) furnished a legal department and a claim depart-
ment for the system, (7) examined and approved prospective
employees of the operating companies, and (8) furnished rules
as to the discharge of such employees.
In Ross v. Penna. Railroad Co.," where the parent was held
on the instrumentality rule for the negligence of the subsidiary,
the evidence used was (i) the advertising time tables, (2) uni-
forms of train crew, and (3) letters written plaintiff by de-
fendant's claim adjuster which seemed to concede responsibility
for the tort of the subsidiary railroad company. The time tables
and uniforms were of course an indication that the subsidiary
was operated as a part of the Pennsylvania railroad system.
In the case of the Willem van Driel, Sr.,4 we have a case
12 284 N.Y. Supp. 183, 157 Misc. 627 (i935), aff'd, 286 N.Y. Supp.
666 (App. Div. 1936).
13 io6 N.J.L. 536, 148 At. 741 (1930).
'4 252 Fed. 35 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1918).
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where the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was sued for dam-
ages growing out of the destruction of a ship which was being
unloaded at the dock of an elevator company. An explosion
and fire occurred as a result of the negligence of employees of
the latter. The Pennsylvania through a lease contract was in
complete control of the Elevator Company, having leased all
the property of a railroad corporation which owned the stock
in the Elevator Company. The following words from the
court's opinion are worth quoting: "The Elevator Co. could
accept no grain except that which came over the tracks of the
controlling road. The general superintendent of the Pennsyl-
vania Co. in Baltimore, as an incident of that office, is president
of the Elevator Company. The treasurer, the assistant secre-
tary, comptroller, subcomptroller and other accounting officers
holding similar positions in the railroad company have charge of
the accounts of the Elevator Company but are paid by the Rail-
road Company. An employee of the railroad company signs
the vouchers of the Elevator Company as its auditor of dis-
bursements. The railroad company, through various officers,
issued orders, from time to time, as to the management of the
Elevator Company. The salary of the superintendent of the
Elevator Company was increased by order of the fourth vice
president of the railroad company. The railroad company con-
trols the funds of the Elevator Company. * * * It is true
that the Elevator Company and its stockholders and directors
held meetings, but in all essential particulars, their action was
dictated and controlled by the railroad company. The whole
course of dealing showed that the surplus of $200,0o0 it had
in the bank at the time of the fire was absolutely under the
control of the railroad company. The superintendent of the
Elevator Company, who directed its mechanical operation and
its subordinate employees, had no duty to perform with the
railroad company but was evidently under its ultimate control.
It would be impossible to imagine a relationship between corpo-
rations where the subsidiary corporation was more completely
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under the control of the dominant corporation. The elevators
were constructed and operated merely as a facility to the busi-
ness of the railroad company. Applying the language of Judge
Wallace, in Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. DuPont, 128 Fed.
840 (C.C.A. 2d, 1904) the potential and ultimate control of
all the property and business affairs of the Elevator company
was lodged in the railroad company, and this control was exer-
cised as completely and directly as the machinery of corporate
organism would permit. Such complete dominance made the
elevator company its mere puppet."' 5
In the group of contract cases where the rule has been dis-
cussed, we find much opposition from the courts to the idea of
holding the parent on contracts and debts of the subsidiary
merely because the subsidiary is controlled as an instrumental-
ity. Some of the cases supporting such a rule are of doubtful
value as they could have been sustained on other grounds. Of
this latter type of cases are Platt v. Bradner,6 John Church Co.
v. Martinez, and Dillard and Coffin Co. v. Richmond Cotton
"' Other negligence cases illustrating the rule, but which are inconclusive
for the purpose of this paper because of peculiar facts involved are Specht v.
Mo. Pac. Ry., 154 Minn. 314, 191 N.W. 905 (923), where the employees
of the so-called instrumentality were in reality the employees of the parent
and directly under the parent's control; Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W. R. Grace
& Co., z67 Fed. 676 (C.C.A. 4 th, i92o), where the servient corporation was
so grossly undercapitalized, and intrusted with such large properties and busi-
ness enterprises by the dominant corporation, without actual ownership, that
the court found the arrangement to be "unconscionable"; and The Santa
Barbara, 299 Fed. 147 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1924), where the facts show direct
operation of the property of the subsidiary by employees of the parent.
There are a number of tort cases in which the courts have stated the
instrumentality rule in the form of the first type statement set out at the
beginning of this paper but found that no instrumentality was shown by the
evidence. Harlan Public Service Co. v. Eastern Construction Co., 254 Ky.
135, 71 S.-W. (zd) 24 (934); Stephenson v. List Laundry and Dry Clean-
ers, 168 So. 317 (La. App., 1936); McDermott v. A.B.C. Oil Burner Sales
Corp., 266 111. App. I15 (1932); Louisville Gas and Electric Co. v. Moore,
et UX., 215 Ky. 273, 284 S.W. 1o82 (1926). But the case of Nashville
C. & S. L. Ry. v. Faris, x66 Tenn. z38, 6o S.W. (ad) 425 0933)
, 
seems,
on the evidence, to give mere lip service to the rule.
16 131 Wash. 533, 230 Pac. 633 (1924).
17 204 SAW. 486 (Texas Civ. App., 1918).
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Oil Co."8 where the facts disclosed an estoppel. In these cases,
the dominant corporation had either represented to the plaintiff
that it owned, or was identical with, the contracting corporation
and would see to the performance of the contract, or payment
of the debt.
Kimberley Coal Co. v. Douglas,'9 found the parent liable
for the contract of its instrumentality on the authority of the
instrumentality rule alone, as did Hunter v. Baker Motor Ve-
hicle Co.2" The issue as raised was vital to the decision in these
cases, though they were not cases of direct action against the
parent on the debt.
Old Ben Coal Co. v. Universal Coal Co.," sustained a dec-
laration in an action against the Price Hill Colliery Co. for a
debt contracted by the Universal Coal Co. on the allegation that
the Universal Coal Co. was "in this transaction, and in its busi-
ness and affairs merely the agent, adjunct and instrumentality
of the Price Hill Colliery Company."
The case of Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain
Transportation Co.22 was an action against the parent for debt
for services rendered the subsidiary. The court found the com-
panies to be separate on the evidence and said: "Control
through ownership of shares does not fuse the corporations even
when the directors are common to each. One corporation may,
however, become an actor in a part of a business, or a whole
business, and when it has, will be legally responsible. To be-
come so, it must take immediate direction of the transaction
through its officers by whom alone it can act at all. At times
this is put as though the subsidiary became an agent of the par-
ent. That may no doubt be true but only in quite other situa-
tions, that is, when both intend that relation to arise, for agency
is consensual. This is seldom true, and liability normally, must
18 140 Tenn. 290, 204 S.W. 758 (1918).
19 45 Fed. (2d) 25 (C.C.A. 6th, 1930).
2 725 Fed. ioo6 (D.C.N.Y. 1915).
21 248 Mich. 486, 227 N.W. 794 (929).
22 3 Fed. (2d) 265 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1929).
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depend upon the parent's direct intervention in the transaction
ignoring the subsidiary's paraphernalia of incorporation direc-
tors and officers. The test is therefore rather in the form than
in the substance of control, in whether it is exercised immedi-
ately or by means of a board of directors and officers, left to
their own initiative and responsibility in respect of each trans-
action as it arises. Some such line must obviously be drawn if
shareholding alone does not fuse the corporation in every case."
As noted, the direct intervention of the parent and direction
of the transaction involved seems here to be the test. Generally
in the cases where the instrumentality rule is recognized the
court has been satisfied with a more diffused control. A domina-
tion of the policies and an ultimate control is sufficient. A direct
interposition in each transaction or an immediate direction of
the employees of the subsidiary has not been essential. As a
generalization, the language oi fhis case is an admission that,
even in the case of contracts, the parent is liable if the control is
sufficiently obtrusive.
In Pagel Horton & Co. v. Harmon Paper Co.,23 an effort
was made to collect the insolvent subsidiary's debt from the par-
ent. The opinion was devoted to showing that all the business
of parent and subsidiary was kept strictly separate and that the
subsidiary was not an instrumentality. Each kept separate
books, maintained and operated its own plant, had separate cus-
tomers, manufactured a different kind of paper, paid its own
debts out of its own treasury, made its own contracts in its own
name, and kept strict account of loans made one to the other.
The opinion, however, noted two exceptions to the observance
of the legal entity of a corporation. The first was the usual one
as to its being a cloak for fraud or illegality and the second was
where the subservient corporation "is so organized, related to or
controlled by the other as to be its mere agent, instrumentality
or alter ego.' ' A
23 258 N.Y. Supp. 168, 263 App. Div. 47 (193z).
24 The cases of United Smelting Refining & Mining Exporation Co. v.
lWallapai Mining & Development Co., 77 Ariz. 126, 230 Pac. 11o9 (I924),
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In a number of important contract cases, where the decision
was in favor of the parent though the subsidiary was conceded
to be an instrumentality the court has stated that it must be
shown that the domination of the parent over the subsidiary was
carried out in such a manner as to defraud or wrong the com-
plainant. But it is usually emphasized that the plaintiff was not
wronged since he selected the subsidiary to be his debtor." In
North v. The Higbee Co.," the contract involved was a long
term lease signed with a subsidiary of a department store com-
pany. In Gledhill v. Fisher," the matter was similar, being a
land contract which the parent employed a subsidiary to take.
In the Carpenter case"8 the subject matter consisted of bonds
signed by a coal company owned and operated by a railroad
company as an instrumentality.
In the last mentioned case, the Federal Circuit Court speak-
ing of the frequently quoted statement of the instrumentality
rule said, "We do not think these decisions establish a hard and
fast rule from which there is no escape, whatever the circum-
stances under consideration, and without regard to the reasons
upon which an, exception could be properly founded. But in
every case in which a corporation has been held liable for the
debt of another because of dominance or control through stock
ownership or otherwise, and not depending on principles of
agency or estoppel, the reason was, that to hold otherwise would
result in a wrong for which the law must find a remedy." And
later in the discussion there is this: "From the examination of
many decisions, we venture to say that no corporation, acting
within its powers, has been held liable for the debts of another
and Martin v. Development Co. of America, z4o Fed. 42 (C.C.A. 9 th,
1917), while recognizing the rule in contract cases, handle the facts in such
a way as to practically refute it.
25 Nort v. The Higbee Company, 131 Ohio St. 507, 3 N.E. (2d) 391
(1936); Gledhill v. Fisher, 272 Mich. 353, 262 N.W. 371 (1935); New
York Trust Company v. Carpenter, 250 Fed. 668 (C.C.A. 6th, i9).
26 See note 25, supra.
27 See note 25, supra.
28 See note 25, supra.
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corporation legally organized, because it controlled such corpo-
ration by reason of ownership or otherwise, except by reason of
contract, or on ground of agency or estoppel, or because the
controlled corporation has been used in such a way that the
maintenance of its character as a separate and distinct entity
would work injustice."
But in Kimberley Coal Co. v. Dogglas," the circuit court in
the same circuit later used the instrumentality rule in a contract
case. The Jewett Bigelow and Brooks Coal Company of De-
troit, Michigan, had a subsidiary company, the J. B. Stores Co.
An action was brought against the parent alone on a claim grow-
ing out of the abandonment of a mining lease from plaintiff to
the parent and the subsidiary. A judgment was had, a certain
part of the claim being dropped. Later the J. B. Stores Co., the
subsidiary, was in receivership and the dropped part of the
claim was presented to the receiver. However, the claim was
rejected. It was held to have been already adjudicated in the
Michigan trial although the Stores Company was not a party.
The court said: "This contention as to the independent liability
of the J. B. Stores Company cannot be maintained. If, as is con-
ceded, the J. B. Stores Company was a mere instrumentality,
used by the Jewett Bigelow and Brooks Coal Company in the
conduct of its business, the property of the Stores Company
must, in equity, be considered the property of the Jewett Bige-
low and Brooks Coal Company and the debts of the subsidiary
as the debts of the parent company. The independent entity of
the two companies is so far disregarded that each is considered
as but a part of the indivisible whole."
It is not without significance that in negligence cases the
instrumentality rule is so often approved and that in contract
cases it is often denied, for in the contract cases, there enters the
possibility of a selection by the third person. In the contract
cases the court frequently finds there was no fraud upon the
plaintiff because with his eyes open he selected the instrumen-
11 45 Fed. (2d) z5 (C.C.A. 6th, 1930).
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tality. It is then stated that the instrumentality must be used
to wrong or defraud plaintiff if it is to be disregarded as a sepa-
rate entity. It would be logically possible for the court to ad-
here to the instrumentality rule and still hold in such cases that
the complainant cannot recover from the dominant corporation
since he has made an election, a familiar analogy from the law
of principal and agent.
It would seem that such a solution would be logical and sal-
utary as tending to simplicity and greater certainty in prediction
of the law. It would likewise be a salutary advance if, in con-
tract cases, the courts might adopt by analogy a further principle
from the law of principal and agent, namely, that where the
third person has before him the principal and the agent and
enters into a contract, in terms with the agent, it is presumed
that he does not, by so doing, intend to release the principal and
confine his recovery to the agent; but rather that he intends
recourse against both. This presumption may be overcome by
showing either from the language of the contract, or other evi-
dence that this act was intended as a selection of the agent
alone."0 This need not involve any confusion with other parts
of the law of principal and agent. Agency as a consensual rela-
tionship is quite a different thing from the instrumentality situ-
ation arising where one corporation dominates and uses another
for the carrying out of the purposes of the dominant corporation.
It has been argued that in cases using the instrumentality
rule, the court has, in each case, decided the case either against
or for the parent upon some equitable ground and, after that,
has proceeded to rationalize its decision by holding that the sub-
sidiary was or was not dominated as an instrumentality; and
this though the equitable reasons may not have been mentioned
in the opinion. This line of reasoning grows from the ad absur-
d m argument already mentioned, that there is no practical dif-
ference between control growing out of mere ownership of
stock and election of the directors and the obtrusive controls
30 Restatement of the Law of Agency, Sec. 149.
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discussed in this paper. 1 But after all, lawyers, in practice, are
dealing with judicial precedents and the cases may not be ig-
nored. And, conceding the argument, these courts are moving
toward a desired objective by the easiest gradient. And there
is a real difference between the case of a corporation holding
stock in another corporation merely as an investment, and that
of a corporation using another controlled corporation to perform
some part of the business of the dominant corporation or some
function essential to its business.
Another argument that has been used is that in no case will
the instrumentality rule be effective unless the dominant corpo-
ration is using the servient one in such a way that some one of
the familiar rules for disregarding the corporate entity comes
into play. A classification of such cases includes cases of fraud,
obstruction of justice, evasion of law, estoppel, stripping the
subsidiary of its assets, fraudulent undercapitalization of the
subsidiary, etc. This method of handling the cases denies re-
sponsibility of the parent in many cases where, under the instru-
mentality rule as discussed in this paper, the parent would be
liable."
Space will not permit an examination of the cases which
support the argument in the foregoing paragraph. For Ohio,
in a contract case, the conclusion in the foregoing paragraph is
followed in North v. The Higbee Company." That case grew
out of a situation where a department store company used a
wholly owned realty company to take a long term lease on the
department store site. In turn the department store took but a
ten-year lease. This arrangement gave the department store a
practical option on as many renewals of its lease as it might
desire without absolute liability on the long lease. The depart-
ment store abandoned the premises and failed to renew the ten-
year lease. The realty company could not pay the rentals and
3" See Latty, Subsidiaries and Affiliated Corporations (1936).
32 See Powell, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (193 I).
33 Supra, note 25. Three judges dissented.
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taxes. Unfortunately, two years after the original lease trans-
actions above mentioned, the lessor had assigned its underlying
leasehold to a Trust Co. and leasehold trust certificates were
sold. When the department store company abandoned the
premises and the realty company defaulted, one of these certifi-
cate holders sued the department store company on his own
behalf and on behalf of all certificate holders. His case was won
and a judgment was obtained in a sum in excess of $769,ooo.
This was sustained in the court of appeals but reversed in the
Supreme Court. There was found to be no fraud in the original
lease transactions as the lessor understood the situation and
elected to give the long lease to the subsidiary. It was further
found that the certificate holders were not wronged because
(j) they should have known the circumstances, and (2) their
losses in reality grew out of a vast deflation in realty values due
to the depression. The syllabus, by the court, reads: "The sep-
arate entities of a parent and subsidiary corporation will not be
disregarded and the parent corporation will not be held liable
for the acts and obligations of its subsidiary corporation, not-
withstanding the facts that the latter was controlled by the par-
ent through its stock ownership, and that the officers and direc-
tors of the parent corporation were likewise officers and directors
of the subsidiary in the absence of proof that the subsidiary was
formed for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud and that dom-
ination of the parent over its subsidiary was exercised in such
manner as to defraud complainant."3"
34 In addition to quotations from Powell, Parent & Subsidiary Corporations
(193I) the court also quoted the following from Gledhill v. Fisher, z7z
Mich. 353, 262 N.W. 391 (1935).
"3. To justify treating sole stockholder or holding company liable as
responsible for a subsidiary corporation, it is not enough that the subsidiary is
so organized and controlled as to make it merely an instrumentality, conduit,
or adjunct of its stockholders, but it must further appear that to recognize
their separate entities would aid in the consummation of a wrong.
"4. Relief against a parent corporation should be granted only if a refusal
to do so would result in an unjust loss or injury to the complainant since
refusal to recognize the ordinary immunity of stockholders not only overturns
a basic provision of statutory or common law but is also contrary to a vital
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It is to be noted that this was a contract case, one in which
an election to hold the subsidiary was clear and one in which no
fraud or wrong upon plaintiff was found to exist by the major-
ity. Nevertheless three judges dissented, two of them holding
that no other element is essential to hold the parent but to show
that the subsidiary is a mere agent, arm, or instrumentality of
the parent. Williams, J., in his dissent, said: "If the subsidiary
is a mere agent, arm, instrumentality or department of the
parent in the transaction in which the debt is incurred, such
debt is that of the parent regardless of the existence of fraud."
And Zimmerman, J., dissenting, quoted the language which
found its inception in In re Watertown Paper Co."
The writer has endeavored to present the views of those
courts which have made use of the instrumentality formula for
parent responsibility and particularly in tort and contract cases.
It proves to be a very convenient yardstick of liability. It is
obviously just in the tort cases. Referring again to the language
of the Court in Industrial Research Corporation v. General
Motors Corporation, supra, and applying the spirit of the lan-
guage to other types of corporations, it is against public policy
to permit a corporation to carry on its authorized business
through incorporated departments and to perform its vital func-
tions through incorporated instrumentalities, as that term is de-
fined in this paper, and at the same time escape the concomitant
responsibility for their acts. Practically this is important to the
injured person as it gives him a direct route, for compensation,
to the prime mover as well as to the instrumentality. It may
be vital to him when the subsidiary is a small corporation or an
insolvent one.
economic policy of the whole corporate concept." And from Wormser's Dis-
regard of the Corporate Fiction and Allied Corporate Problems, p. 18, the
following is quoted: "It follows that no fraud is committed in incorporating
for the precise purpose of avoiding and escaping personal responsibility. In-
deed, that is why most people incorporate, and those dealing with corporations
know, or are at least presumed to know the law in this regard."
35 See p. 1, this article, for the quotation.
The same statements may apply to cases of contract made
with the subsidiary and debts contracted by the subsidiary.
Here, however, enters the element of choice. The third person
may choose between the parent and subsidiary. Those courts
which apply the instrumentality rule to contract cases and ordi-
nary debts of the subsidiary should admit the possibility of an
election on the part of the third person to look to the subsidiary
alone, and doubtless would in a proper case. Because of the fact
that the business of parent and subsidiary is so often inter-
meshed in such fashion as to cause inevitable confusion in the
minds of those dealing with the corporations it would be proper
to throw upon the parent the burden of proving that the third
person elected to deal with the subsidiary alone. And if the
court is willing to trace the analogy between the case of parent
corporation and instrumentality and the ordinary case of prin-
cipal and agent, there is ample precedent for such a rule re-
garding election. With these provisions the instrumentality rule
is a proper one in the contract and debt cases. It is significant
that so many courts have applied the instrumentality rule in
such cases.
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